The Death Effect in Art Prices: Evidence from Denmark by Maddison, David James
www.ssoar.info
The Death Effect in Art Prices: Evidence from
Denmark
Maddison, David James
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Maddison, D. J. (2008). The Death Effect in Art Prices: Evidence from Denmark. Applied Economics, 40(14),
1789-1793. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840600905191
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-240260
For Peer Review
The Death Effect in Art Prices: Evidence from Denmark 
Journal: Applied Economics 
Manuscript ID: APE-05-0606 
Journal Selection: Applied Economics 
Date Submitted by the 
Author: 31-Oct-2005 
JEL Code:
D42 - Monopoly < D4 - Market Structure and Pricing < D - 
Microeconomics, D44 - Auctions < D4 - Market Structure and 
Pricing < D - Microeconomics, E30 - General < E3 - Prices, Business 
Fluctuations, and Cycles < E - Macroeconomics and Monetary 
Economics 
Keywords: Art Prices, Durable Monopoly, Auctions 
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
For Peer Review
The Death Effect in Art Prices: Evidence from Denmark  
 
By David Maddison1 and Anders Jul-Pedersen 
 
Department of Economics, 
University College London, 
Gower Street, 
London WC1E 6BT 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7679 5859 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7916 2775 
Email: d.maddison@ucl.ac.uk 
 
1 Corresponding author.  
Page 1 of 18
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
The Death Effect in Art Prices: Evidence from Denmark  
 
Page 2 of 18
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Abstract 
Analysing a panel of paintings by Danish painters suggests that the conditional life expectancy of 
the artist at the time of sale has a negative impact on the sale price. This is consistent with the idea 
that artists share some of the characteristics of durable monopolists and that the ageing and 
ultimately the death of the artist represent acceptable forms of commitment not to ‘overproduce’. In 
addition interest in an artist’s work begins to wane after their death.  
 
Keywords: Art Prices; Auctions; Durable Monopolist 
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Introduction 
 
Economists have often studied the art market in an attempt to answer the perennial question: Is art a 
good investment? In order to answer this question however requires an index of art prices over time. 
It is difficult to provide such an index because art objects are heterogenous and not traded very 
often. One cannot simply take an average price of all works traded within a particular period or take 
a basket of art works and calculate the cost of purchasing that basket. This being so two alternative 
approaches are typically taken to computing the rate of return on paintings over time. The first of 
these is the hedonic approach in which differences in the characteristics of paintings are controlled 
for using regression analysis. Variables include things like the dimension of the painting, the 
materials used, the date of the painting etc. The other technique is the resale method and is a more 
direct method of calculating the rate of return to art. This approach waits until a painting has been 
sold twice and then computes the rate of return over the intervening period.  
 
From Baumol (1986) onwards the general finding is that the rate of return on art is lower than that 
obtained on risk free financial assets. The reason for this is that individuals presumably derive a 
non-pecuniary benefit from possessing art that is quite independent of the financial rate of return 
that they expect to achieve when the time comes to sell the painting (Frey and Eichenberger, 1995). 
The difference between the financial rate of return on the painting and the rate of return on 
alternative financial asset therefore reflects the benefit that the individual derives from possessing 
the painting. Unless one actually likes the picture, ownership of a painting is therefore not a good 
investment. Neither can it be said that art is a particularly liquid asset since the costs of buying and 
selling are high. Chanel (1995) demonstrates that art markets are linked to financial markets but 
Ginsburgh and Jeanfils (1995) argue that there is only a short run relationship between the two.  
 
A second reason that economists have studied the market for art is in order to test the efficient 
market hypothesis and the law of one price. The efficient market hypothesis does not however 
receive much support from the analysis of art markets. It would appear that one is able to predict 
future price movements on the basis of past price movements and that there is significant serial 
correlation in the data. Furthermore it is frequently said that old masters enjoy a higher rate of 
return than contemporary artists of the works of lesser-known artists (although a sequence of papers 
suggests that the opposite might be true). There also appear to be deviations from the law of one 
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price in which identical prints are sold for different prices days apart with no intervening release of 
information. Some auction houses appear to obtain consistently higher prices for auctioned 
paintings, and there is evidence to suggest that art prices are systematically lower in some months 
than in others. Ashenfelter and Graddy (2003) provide a recent survey of the literature. 
 
One characteristic of artists that has not so far received much analytical attention is that they suffer 
the same problems encountered by a monopoly producer of durable goods. The problem of the 
durable goods monopolist first described by Coase (1972) is that the monopoly producer cannot 
sign a contract limiting future production. Then the best thing he can do after having sold a unit is to 
try and sell another for as high a price as he can obtain. This goes on until the price falls to the 
marginal cost of production. But consumers will anticipate the fall in price and be unwilling to pay 
more than the competitive price for the goods. Thus the monopolist forfeits his monopoly power. 
 
The artist shares the same difficulty as any other durable monopolist in that he or she lacks any 
credible commitment not to ‘overproduce’ in future time periods (e.g. Grampp, 1989). The word 
‘overproduce’ should however be extended to include anything that might jeopardise the market 
value of paintings already sold to collectors. It seems that the only credible commitment that the 
artist can make not to over-produce in future time periods is either to die or at least grow old to the 
point where the ability to overproduce is limited by a short remaining life expectancy and declining 
health. This phenomenon might explain why artists often enjoy greater success dead than they did 
alive. The problem appears elsewhere in the field of culture as well. There is for example, the 
problem of the book publisher who would like to persuade individuals to buy an expensive 
hardback copy of a book rather than waiting for the paperback edition. Once individuals have 
bought the hardback version however the incentives of the publisher change.  
 
A number of solutions to the problem of the durable monopolist have been suggested in the context 
of industrial economics (Bulow, 1982). One possibility is to rent the product rather than to sell it. 
Another possibility is to make binding commitments about future production, issue price guarantees 
or to make the product less durable than it otherwise would be. These do not seem to help the artist 
much. One possibility is that the artist who makes lithographs can destroy the plates.  
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There is nevertheless one mechanism by which the artist might be able to enjoy the financial 
benefits of their work prior to their death. This is practice of ‘droit de suite’ (Solow, 1998). Under 
this practice the artist has the right to a percentage of the selling price every time one of his 
paintings is sold. This right is inalienable and continues for a period even after the artist’s death. It 
clearly burdens the artist with some of the risk of uncertain future price changes. This might lead to 
the artist not producing copies of original work or doing anything that might lower his stock as an 
artist such as a failure to censor sub-standard pieces of work. Note that this practice is illegal in all 
the United States except for California, but more common in Europe. From January 2006 a 
European Union directive will harmonise the practice throughout member states leading to concern 
over the possible relocation of trade to locations such as Zurich and New York. 
 
The impact of the changed supply conditions associated with the death of the artist has been 
examined by Ekelund et al (2000) whose study involves 21 Latin American artists whose works 
have been sold at major auction houses in USA. The conclusion of the paper is that there is a 
measurable “death effect”. Prices rise around the time of the artist’s death but fall again. 
Unfortunately the results use a questionable variable for representing the death effect “years after 
death” squared (i.e. the year of sale minus the year of death of the artist squared so as to ensure that 
the variable takes only positive values). Ekelund et al attribute their results to the existence of 
durable monopoly. It is not immediately clear however why the death of the artist should result in a 
symmetric response in prices around the time of their death, nor why the effect should be identical 
for all artists irrespective of whether they die prematurely or survive until old age.  
 
Recently, Matheson and Baade (2004) have suggested that any death effect in art prices and in 
collectibles generally is a transient phenomenon caused by renewed interest in the artist’s work 
following news of their death. They refer to this as the “nostalgia effect” and demonstrate its 
existence using time series data on the price of sports cards for 13 famous baseball players. The 
interesting aspect of their study is that the baseball cards are already fixed in supply following the 
retirement of the player and that changed perceptions regarding the supply of the cards around the 
time of the players death cannot therefore account for any observed price dynamics. The authors 
find that there is an increase in the price of cards around the time of a player’s death but that it is 
short-lived. But whilst Matheson and Baade’s work demonstrates the existence of a “nostalgia 
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effect” it does not say anything about the existence of a death effect associated with the problem of 
durable monopoly precisely because changed supply conditions are absent in their example.  
 
The purpose of this paper is examine closely the price dynamics of an artist’s work around the time 
of their death. More specifically we argue that although temporary renewed interest and a change in 
perceived supply conditions might both cause an increase in prices following the death of the artist, 
only concern over supply conditions can explain why the conditional life expectancy of the artist at 
the time when the painting is sold should be reflected in the price. We use of the artist’s conditional 
life expectancy at the time of sale to represent supply conditions because from the perspective of the 
collector, an ageing artist means that supply conditions are improving all the time. For the same 
reason any death effect should be most pronounced for those who die prematurely since supply 
conditions for an artist in their nineties are already quite favourable to the collector. Furthermore, 
prices should not change after the death of an artist since supply conditions cannot change and 
conditional life expectancy falls to zero at this point. To anticipate the results, it appears that using 
conditional life expectancy of the artist at the time of sale as a proxy for supply conditions, the 
durable monoply hypothesis has considerable empirical content even when variables are included to 
account for any temporary renewed interest in the artist following news of their death.  
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Data 
The data set used to compare the “durable monopolist” and “nostalgia effect” explanation of price 
dynamics around the time of death of the artist comprises the price of oil paintings by contemporary 
Danish artists who died during the period 1983 to 2003. The price data was extracted from Hislop’s 
Art Price Index. The first sale took place in 1971 and the last recorded sale was in 2003. The 
paintings included in the data set were all sold at auction, reflecting the most visible segment of the 
art market. This means that the study does not reflect the entire art market, but it rather the largest 
part with the highest prices. The data set contains 4,857 transactions of paintings by 93 artists. No 
bought-in paintings (i.e. paintings that failed to reach their reservation price) are included in the 
data set. The price of the paintings (PRICE) is in current USD.  
 
The identity of the artist is treated as a fixed effect in what follows accounting for the style as well 
as the reputation of the artist. The exact day of birth and death of the artists were found via a 
database for Danish artists.2 Because the day of the sale is also known it is possible to create a 
dummy variable (DEAD) indicating whether the artist was dead or alive at the time of the sale. 
Another variable was created to represent the time elapsed between the death of the artist and the 
time of the sale (YEARS_AFTER_DEATH). This variable takes the value zero for paintings sold 
while the artist is still alive. Finally, combining knowledge of the artist’s date of birth as well as the 
date of sale makes it possible, via a database on Danish demographic statistics, to compute the 
artist’s conditional life expectancy at the time of sale (COND_LIFE_EXPECT).3 This variable is 
obviously zero for those artists who were already dead at the time of sale. There is a great deal of 
variation in the data set: the youngest artist to die lived until 38 whilst the oldest artist to die 
survived until 100. Table 1 gives information on conditional life expectancy in Denmark for the 
decade 1990-1999.  
 
Apart from the personal details of the artist, a number of other characteristics are contained in the 
data set. These include whether the painting is attributed to the artist as opposed to being signed 
(ATTRIBUTED). Two different auction houses are separately identified: KUNSTHALLE and 
RASMUSSEN. The latter auction house includes paintings sold by Bruun who merged with 
 
2 The databse on Danish artists can be found at: www.kid.dk.
3 Information on conditional life expectancies for Denmark for the decade 1990-1999 can be found at: 
www.mortality.org.
Page 8 of 18
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
6
Rasmussen to become the biggest in Scandinavia and the world’s 10th largest auction house. 
Shortly after the final sale recorded in the data set Kunsthallen too was purchased by Bruun 
Rasmussen. The remaining paintings were sold by miscellaneous auctioneers, including the 
Museumsbygningen (the art museum in Copenhagen), Sothebys and Christies etc. Selling at auction 
at the Museumsbygningen in Copenhagen costs 16 percent of the realised value of the painting 
indicating how difficult it is to take account of opportunities for arbitrage.  
 
Three different places of sale are identified: COPENHAGEN, AARHUS (Denmark’s second largest 
city) and VEJLE near the German border (many collectors are German). Other places of sale not 
separately identified include Stockholm, London, and Amsterdam etc. The vast majority of the 
paintings were sold within Denmark. The size of the painting (SIZE) is measured in square inches.  
 
Note that the effect of the artist’s age at time of production is not included because it is not 
systematically recorded in the data set. The artist’s age at the time of production might explain 
some of the variance in the price of paintings. However, the timing of any “peaks” and “slumps” of 
the artist’s career will differ markedly from artist to artist. By contrast, the effect of conditional life 
expectancy on perceived supply conditions is, at the time of sale, the same for all artists. 
Furthermore there is no relationship between the age of the artist at the time at which a painting is 
sold and the age of the artist when the work was created, other than that the former necessarily 
exceeds the latter.4
4 Gallenson et al (2000) published a study looking at the age of the artist on the day of the paintings execution and the 
value of his work. The study looks at 42 contemporary America artists, and finds that artists born before 1920 were 
most likely to produce the most valuable work late in their careers and those born in the 1920s and 30s early in their 
careers. Some artists however peak at age 66 or 84 and overall there is great variation.  
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Table 1. The Conditional Life Expectancy of the Danish 1990-1999 
Age Conditional Life Expectancy 
0 75.61
1-4 75.04 
5-9 71.13 
10-14 66.19 
15-19 61.24 
20-24 56.37 
25-29 51.53 
30-34 46.70 
35-39 41.92 
40-44 37.21 
45-49 32.62 
50-54 28.15 
55-59 23.87 
60-64 19.86 
65-69 16.22 
70-74 12.95 
75-79 10.06 
80-84 7.55 
85-89 5.46 
90-94 3.83 
95-99 2.73 
100-104 2.02 
105-109 1.59 
110+ 1.37 
Source: The Human Mortality Database. 
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Empirical Analysis 
 
In order to reveal price dynamics associated with the ageing and death of the artist it is first 
necessary to control for autonomous trends in the price of paintings. This is achieved by creating a 
series of linear spline functions with knots placed at yearly intervals. These spline functions are 
included in all subsequent regressions, but the coefficients are not displayed in the table of results.  
 
Table 2 contains the results of three models of increasing complexity. In each model the dependent 
variable PRICE is taken in the logarithms following attempts at a Box-Cox transformation. In 
Model 1 the variable COND_LIFE_EXPECT is included as a proxy for anticipated supply 
conditions. The coefficient on this variable is negative suggesting that conditional life expectancy of 
the artist at the time of sale has a significant depressing effect on art prices. Turning to the 
remaining variables, a painting that is merely attributed to a particular artist rather than actually 
signed attracts a lower price. Paintings sold by the two major auction houses Kunsthalle and 
Rasmussen attract a higher price whilst paintings sold in Copenhagen, Aarhus and Vejle all attract 
lower prices. These variables likely serve as a proxy for the characteristics of particular pieces 
leading them to be sold in particular places and by particular auction houses.5 The size of the 
painting is statistically significant but the increase in price per square inch of canvas varies as the 
size of the painting increases. 
 
Model 2 includes the dummy variable DEAD along with the variable YEARS_AFTER_DEATH. 
The purpose of this specification is to represent a situation in which the death of the artist generates 
renewed interest in his work that gradually ebbs away (or depending on the sign of the coefficient 
even increases). The results suggest that prices jump following the artist’s death but the effect is 
significant only at the five percent level of confidence. The price of an artist’s work does however 
fall significantly in the years following their death.  
 
Model 3 combines the previous two models. As before there is evidence of the existence of a 
durable monopoly, at least in so far as the fact that the artist’s conditional life expectancy at the 
time of the sale is highly significant. The dummy variable denoting the period following the death 
 
5 The most important Danish paintings are obviously sold outside of Denmark. 
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of the artist is however, not significant. There is no surge in interest in an artist’s work following 
their death. Only the time trend measuring years after death is significant.  
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Table 2. Regression Analysis 
Dependent Variable = Log PRICE 
Method = Fixed Effects Panel Data 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
ATTRIBUTED -0.592833 
(-4.07) 
-0.6558729    
(-4.58) 
-0.6149806    
(-4.24) 
KUNSTHALLE 0.2283518 
(3.94) 
0.2258041    
(3.92) 
0.2254439    
(3.91) 
RASMUSSEN 0.1452296    
(2.56) 
0.1393776    
(2.48) 
0.1396537    
(2.48) 
COPENHAGEN -0.4371322    
(-5.85) 
-0.4318278     
(-5.79) 
-0.4320232    
(-5.79) 
AARHUS -0.5177402    
(-8.36) 
-0.516128 
(-8.32) 
-0.5171571     
(-8.34) 
VEJLE -0.602433 
(-7.54) 
-0.5935193    
(-7.43) 
-0.5898853    
(-7.38) 
SIZE 0.0012067 
(18.57) 
0.0012048    
(18.46) 
0.0012034    
(18.61) 
SIZE2 -3.00E-07 
(-7.60) 
-3.02E-07 
(-7.58) 
-2.99E-07 
(-7.61) 
SIZE3 2.53E-11 
(4.26) 
2.57E-11 
(4.31) 
2.51E-11 
(4.29) 
COND_LIFE_EXPECT -0.0134608    
(-5.75) 
 -0.0150265    
(-4.34) 
DEAD   0.0642483    
(2.14) 
-0.0666766    
(-1.53) 
YEARS_AFTER_DEATH  -0.0234978    
(-5.01) 
-0.021138 
(-4.54) 
Number of Observations 4857 4857 4857 
Zero Slopes F(42, 4722) = 71.07 F(43, 4721) = 67.75 F(44, 4720) = 64.61 
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R2 0.1843 0.1983 0.2040 
Note: The regression includes 32 spline functions whose coefficients are not displayed in the table. 
T-statistics are heteroscedastic-consistent. 
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Conclusions 
The results contained in this paper suggest that including information on the artists’ age and 
whether they are dead or alive at the time of sale can explain better the price dynamics of paintings. 
Such findings are consistent with the view that artists share some of the problems encountered by 
monopoly producers of durable goods. Certainly it is hard to think of an alternative reason why the 
artist’s conditional life expectancy at the time of sale should be of such importance to collectors. In 
addition it appears that interest in an artist’s work generally dwindles after their death. There is 
however no sudden leap in art prices following news of the death of the artist other than that 
attributable to the resolution of the problem of the durable monopolist.  
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